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Why doesn’t Asia have bigger bond markets? 
Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai
1 
1. Introduction 
The 1997-98 financial crisis highlighted the problem of bond market underdevelopment in 
Asia. The small size and slow growth of regional bond markets, many observers noted, left 
corporate borrowers excessively dependent on bank finance. Given the short tenor of bank 
loans, a shock to confidence left Asian economies vulnerable to a disruptive credit crunch. 
Since banks denominated many of their loans in foreign currency, exchange rate 
depreciation resulted in serious balance sheet damage and thrust highly leveraged 
corporations into bankruptcy. 
Analysts argued further that Asia’s heavy dependence on banks increased the weight of 
political and economic connections in resource allocation. Banks and the companies to which 
they lent were linked by family control. Banks were used by the authorities to extend 
preferential credit to firms favoured on political or developmental grounds. Financial 
institutions carrying out these tasks came to be seen as too big and politically important to 
fail, and the guarantees they consequently enjoyed weakened market discipline over their 
lending. 
The lesson drawn was that Asian countries need better diversified financial systems, and 
specifically deep and liquid bond markets, to supplement their banking systems. Better 
diversified financial markets would reduce financial fragility and enhance the efficiency of 
capital allocation. The development of bond markets would lengthen the tenor of debt and 
facilitate the placement of domestic currency bonds, limiting maturity mismatches on 
corporate balance sheets. Corporations would be encouraged to disclose more information 
and follow internationally recognised accounting practices, strengthening corporate 
governance. Borrowers would be distanced from lenders, anonymous and decentralised 
bond markets being hard to influence, and markets would be better insulated from 
governments, limiting moral hazard and political interference. 
The problem of Asia’s underdeveloped bond markets was known to close observers, of 
course, even before the 1997-98 crisis. In some cases the absence of bond markets 
complicated efforts to finance large infrastructure projects, and enterprises with a high 
minimum efficient scale found it hard to meet their financial needs.
2 In principle they could 
borrow from a syndicate of banks which could securitise their loans, but securitisation was 
costly and difficult in the absence of a bond market. Banks therefore found it hard to diversify 
risk created by their acquisition of concentrated stakes in the large enterprises that were their 
leading customers. And the development of other financial instruments was limited by the 
absence of bond markets on which to base forwards, futures and more exotic derivatives 
                                                  
1  We thank Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett for help with data and Robert McCauley and Ric Deverell for 
helpful comments. 
2  Infrastructure finance was a particular problem with regard to the privatisation of electricity supply, 
telecommunications and transportation services in Asian countries. More generally, securing adequate finance 
often required diluting corporate control by issuing equity or giving banks representation on corporate boards. 
Since owners saw the dilution of control as unattractive, dynamic enterprises sometimes found it difficult to 
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contracts.
3 These problems were not specific to Asia, to be sure, but they seemed to 
manifest themselves there in particularly dramatic ways. 
Coincident with the Asian crisis, contributions to the theoretical literature explained how 
countries benefit from well diversified financial systems (see eg Boot and Thakor (1997)). 
Equity finance encourages risk-taking, since holders of equity stakes share in supernormal 
returns while their losses are truncated on the downside, whereas debt holders, who do not 
share in exceptional profits, encourage risk aversion; a well diversified financial system 
therefore facilitates risk management. Banks have a comparative advantage in providing 
external finance to smaller, younger firms which typically operate in information-impacted 
segments of the economy, while securities markets do the job most efficiently for large, well 
established companies. 
Thus, as early as 1995, before the Asian crisis, the World Bank had issued studies 
recommending that Asian countries accelerate bond market development (see eg Dalla et al 
(1995)). The crisis then directed additional attention to the problem. The 17 Asian 
governments participating in the Asia Cooperation Dialogue at that time set up a Working 
Group on Financial Cooperation to establish guidelines for the development of Asian bond 
markets. APEC finance ministers agreed on a comprehensive approach to developing sound 
and sustainable regional bond markets, including credit guarantees and markets in a variety 
of new products (bonds denominated in a basket of Asian currencies being the most 
attractive candidate). ASEAN+3 established a Study Group on Capital Market Development 
and Cooperation under the leadership of Thailand, Japan, Korea and Singapore. 
The most prominent of these responses was a proposal to use the international reserves of 
Asian central banks to encourage the development of regional bond markets. The Asian 
Bond Fund (ABF) was launched by EMEAP in June 2003, and its members committed to 
investing USD 1 billion of the region’s international reserves in Asian sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign dollar bonds.
4 
The question is whether this use of central bank reserves will have the desired effect. 
Perhaps, but some critics of this use of central bank reserves will object that other factors 
-  improved regulation, enhanced transparency, stronger investor protection and stable 
macroeconomic policies - are more important for the development of deep and liquid bond 
markets.
5 In their view these fundamentals, and not the allocation of some small fraction of 
the reserves of regional central banks to local debt securities, should be the focus of efforts 
to develop Asian bond markets.  
This uncertainty about what initiatives are most urgently needed to promote Asian bond 
markets reflects our incomplete understanding of why those markets are underdeveloped in 
the first place.
6 This paper therefore considers the historical, structural, institutional and 
                                                  
3  Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) observe that it may still be possible, despite the absence of these markets, 
to tailor forwards, futures and derivatives contracts to the needs of individual customers, but doing so can be 
costly, limiting the use of such instruments. 
4  Some of the proposal’s initiators had envisaged utilising 1% of the international reserves of Asian central 
banks, which would have amounted to USD 12 billion, purchasing domestic currency as well as dollar bonds, 
and investing in corporate as well as government securities. At the time of writing, EMEAP is discussing a 
second Asian bond fund that might be larger in size and would invest in high-grade domestic currency issues. 
5  See Fernandez and Klassen (2003). 
6  While earlier studies touched on the issue, none of them, so far as we know, has analysed it systematically. 
Burger and Warnock (2003, 2004) are the studies closest in spirit to our own, but they consider only long-term 
bonds (not also the short-term bonds considered here) and a subset of the potential determinants of local 
market issuance. Claessens et al (2003) consider both domestic and foreign currency denominated issues, 
but they limit their analysis to government bonds, putting aside the determinants of corporate bond market 
growth. Eichengreen et al (2002) consider corporate as well as government issues, but they too are 
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macroeconomic determinants of bond market development in a cross section of developing 
and developed economies. Section 2 presents an overview of bond markets in emerging 
Asia with comparisons to other regions. Sections 3 and 4 enumerate the hypotheses that 
have been described to explain bond market underdevelopment. Sections 5 and 6 present 
our regression analysis. Section 7 draws out the implications for the development of Asian 
bond markets. 
The results confirm that small size and fragmentation are part of the explanation for the 
underdevelopment of Asia’s bond markets, but only part. In addition, corruption, poor 
regulatory quality and failure to compel firms to follow internationally recognised accounting 
standards have slowed the development of private debt markets. Countries with competitive, 
well capitalised banking systems also have larger bond markets (both public and private), 
suggesting the existence of complementarities between banking and bond market 
development. 
This suggests that, in order to promote the development of bond markets, governments need 
to encourage adherence to internationally recognised accounting standards and enhance the 
reliability of regulation and contract enforcement. They should distance themselves from the 
lending operations of banks in order to accentuate the complementarities between banking 
and bond market development. Through this combination of policies, our results suggest, 
Asian countries could acquire bond markets as liquid and well capitalised as those of other 
regions. 
2. Overview 
Table 1 describes the stock of external finance in various economies at the end of 2001. For 
emerging Asia, bond market capitalisation (the sum of corporate, financial institution and 
public sector issues) was 45% of GDP; this was actually higher than the average for all 
emerging markets, at 39%, if lower than that for developed economies, at 139%. Note that 
we include here only domestic currency bonds issued by residents and targeted to local 
investors.
7 At this level of aggregation, Asia is not behind Latin America or emerging central 
Europe in terms of bond market development, although it is considerably behind the 
developed economies, and in particular the United States.
8 
These regional aggregates disguise considerable variation across countries. Corporate bond 
market capitalisation is 50% of GDP in Malaysia and 28% in Korea but only 5% in Thailand.
9 
Financial institutions are important for bond issuance in Hong Kong SAR, Korea and 
Singapore, but less so in China and Malaysia. They figure hardly at all in external finance in 
Thailand. 
                                                                                                                                                      
concerned with currency denomination, not market capitalisation. Domowitz et al (2000) and Hale (2003) 
analyse the choice between bank and bond finance, but they analyse international bonds and bank loan 
syndications, not their domestic counterparts. 
7  For more discussion of our measure of bond market capitalisation, see Section 4 below. 
8  The picture is not much different when we distinguish between bond issues by non-financial corporations, 
financial institutions and governments. Public issues are slightly less important in emerging Asia than in other 
emerging markets, reflecting the traditionally strong fiscal position of Asian governments, while issues by 
corporations and financial institutions are slightly more important in emerging Asia than elsewhere. 
9  These aggregates need to be interpreted cautiously; in some cases they may tell us less about the scale and 
health of the bond market than might be naively supposed. Thus, in the Korean case, a considerable fraction 
of bond market capitalisation is in the form of asset-backed securities in which the government and its 
agencies have absorbed the risky junior tranche that accounts for the majority of the outstanding stock. BIS Papers No 30  43
 
Table 2 compares the relative importance of bonds, bank loans and equity markets in 
domestic external finance outstanding at the end of 2001.
10 In terms of the composition of 
external finance, Asia relies less on bond markets than other emerging market regions; the 
share of bonds is a bit more than half that of Latin America and emerging central Europe. 
Again, these generalisations disguise considerable variation across countries. For well 
known historical reasons, the banking sector is particularly important for external finance in 
China, Korea and Thailand. The stock market is important only in Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore, where the authorities have aggressively promoted it. The bond market is the least 
important of the three sources of finance in virtually every country (the exception being 
Thailand, where it is approximately the same size as the stock market). Bonds are least 
important in total external finance in Hong Kong and most important in Malaysia and Korea. 
The preceding data are for stocks; flows may offer a clearer picture of recent trends. 
According to Table 3, new domestic bank loans were 10% of GDP in emerging Asia in 2001 
but only 4% of GDP for the emerging markets as a whole. Domestic bond flotations, in 
contrast, amounted to 12% of GDP in 2001 for emerging markets as a whole but only 8% in 
Asia. 
In sum, this overview confirms that emerging Asia relies less on bonds and more on banks 
than other emerging markets, and very much less on bonds and very much more on banks 
than developed economies. Recent data suggest that these distinctive characteristics of 
Asian financial systems are not growing noticeably less pronounced; in some cases the 
opposite may be true. 
3. Hypotheses 
Five broad hypotheses have been advanced to explain the underdevelopment of Asian bond 
markets. One is the region’s history. Banks have dominated Asian financial markets for many 
years. Once upon a time there may have been good reasons for their dominance. 
Imperfections in the information and contracting environment gave a strong comparative 
advantage to bank intermediation, while governments found banks to be convenient vehicles 
for advancing their industrial policies. But although these circumstances have now changed, 
banks retain their “first mover” advantage. Markets, institutions and social conventions have 
adapted to the dominance of bank intermediation. Examples of that adaptation include the 
importance of family connections and state involvement in financial relationships. As a result, 
bonds may face an uphill battle when seeking to acquire market share. 
A second hypothesis emphasises structural characteristics of the region’s economies. Small 
countries presumably find it more difficult to develop bond markets insofar as liquid securities 
markets have a certain minimum efficient scale. Endowment theories suggest that the 
geographical environment shapes the long-standing institutions that influence financial 
development. The strength of bondholder protections may depend on a country’s legal 
tradition (see La Porta (1998)). Not all of these structural characteristics are impervious to 
change, but even the most malleable of them may be difficult to change quickly. 
A third hypothesis focuses on the developmental stage of the region’s economies. Compared 
to the economies of western Europe and North America, most Asian countries have 
                                                  
10  Strictly speaking, total external finance (that is, financing from outside the corporation, excluding retained 
earnings and depreciation) would also include credit provided by foreign sources, for which we lack 
information. To avoid double-counting, we exclude bonds issued by financial institutions from this comparison. 
Including them makes little difference for the comparisons with which we are concerned in this paper. The 
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undergone the transition to modern economic growth relatively recently. Some are still poor. 
At the core of this situation is the underdevelopment of market-supporting institutions, 
including the institutions needed to support financial markets. From this perspective, Asian 
financial markets are underdeveloped because of the unreliability of contract enforcement 
and uncertainty of investor rights that are characteristic of less developed economies. These 
are problems that economies presumably grow out of, though how quickly they do so 
depends on country-specific circumstances. 
A fourth hypothesis focuses on the structure and management of the financial system. This 
explanation considers, inter alia, the intensity of competition among financial institutions, the 
quality of prudential supervision and regulation, the existence of a well defined yield curve, 
the absence of institutional investors and rating agencies, and the adequacy of trading, 
settlement and clearing systems.
11 
Fifth and finally are macroeconomic policies. The currency risk created by flexible exchange 
rates may limit the market for domestic currency denominated securities. Domestic interest 
rate volatility may make it unattractive to hold long-term debt securities. Such instability may 
be a serious impediment to bond market development. Finally, controls on capital flows, such 
as those limiting the ability of foreigners to purchase domestic capital and money market 
securities or to repatriate their interest earnings and principal, may discourage foreign 
participation in domestic markets and rob those markets of liquidity. 
4. Empirical  implications 
We now turn from broad hypotheses to empirical implications, illustrating our points with 
information for 41 economies. The data are for all economies for which the BIS reports 
estimates of domestic bond market capitalisation.
12 Hence, the sample is not limited to Asia. 
But neither are questions about the development of bond markets limited to Asia. In 
analysing the determinants of bond market development we seek to take advantage of the 
information content of a wide cross section of economies. The variables that we use to 
operationalise our five hypotheses are shown in Table 4.
13 
Economic size. Small countries may lack the minimum efficient scale needed for deep and 
liquid bond markets.
14 The amount of money that can be raised by issuing on the local 
                                                  
11  Independent agencies that rate corporate issuers provide information that should help to attract a large base 
of active investors into the bond market. While some Asian countries have independent rating agencies 
(Malaysia, for example, has two), others do not. A large population of institutional investors is important for 
creating a demand for domestic bonds (Schinasi and Smith (1998)). Conversely, heavy regulation of mutual 
funds may prevent fund managers from actively participating in corporate bond markets. Finally, it has been 
argued that the absence of well developed clearing, settlement and trading systems have rendered some 
Asian bond markets illiquid and unattractive (Trairatvorakul (2001)). 
12  The BIS compiles these data from national sources, and attempts to eliminate international debt securities 
from its estimates of domestic bond market capitalisation. Capitalisation is only one measure of bond market 
development, of course; turnover is another obviously relevant dimension. But only capitalisation is available 
for a broad cross section of countries. Previous studies (eg McCauley and Remolona (2000)) suggest that 
capitalisation and turnover on domestic bond markets are strongly if imperfectly correlated. 
13  Information on data sources can be found in the appendix. 
14  Eichengreen et al (2002) provide evidence that small size is similarly the most robust determinant of the 
inability of emerging markets to borrow abroad in their own currencies (“original sin”). Here the obvious 
explanation is that countries whose debt issuance is small have trouble getting international investors to add 
securities denominated in “exotic” currencies to their investment portfolios. This will be the case when the 
increase in management costs is constant but the diversification benefits decline with each additional 
currency. This is probably an appropriate point at which to discuss how domestic bond market development 
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market may be too small to attract multinational corporations and other potential foreign 
issuers. The market may be too small to justify inclusion in the global bond market indices 
constructed by the leading investment banks, in which case there will be no demand to hold 
local securities in order to track the index. Markets in small issues may be characterised by 
price volatility as buyers and sellers enter and exit. Similarly, it may be difficult to put on and 
take off positions without being noticed. There being fixed costs of learning about the 
performance characteristics of an issue, investing in small issues may not be attractive for 
portfolio managers, who will consequently demand a yield premium in order to do so.
15 And if 
adverse selection is present, it may be that no premium will create a demand. A bivariate 
scatter plot of bond market development (measured as domestic bond market capitalisation 
as a share of GDP, averaged over the 1990s) and country size (GDP at purchasing power 
parity (PPP), also averaged over the 1990s) shows a weakly positive relationship between 
the two variables (Figure 1).
16 
Natural openness. Entrenched interests will seek to prevent their advantaged position from 
being undermined by market competition. Banks, for example, will attempt to prevent their 
dominant market share from being eroded by competition from securities markets. But 
entrenched interests will be less able to insist on policies that suppress competing sources of 
supply when the economy is exposed to international competition. This is Rajan and 
Zingales’ (2001) explanation for why more open economies do less to suppress securities 
markets. That said, Figure 2 does not suggest a particularly strong relationship between 
openness, measured as the ratio of exports to GDP, and bond market development. 
Legal system. Legal traditions differ in the priority they attach to protecting minority 
investors. La  Porta et al (1998) predict that common law systems in the British tradition, 
which offer stronger investor protection than systems in the French civil law tradition, should 
promote the development of financial markets. But the same legal traditions may not affect 
all aspects of financial development equally. Where investor rights are weak, savers may 
prefer investing through banks rather than bonds since politically well connected banks are 
better able to enforce their claims (Sharma (2000)). Systems with weak investor rights may 
also encourage creditors to demand assets with seniority (bonds rather than stocks).
17 
Geographical/disease endowments. Endowment theories suggest that environmental 
factors shape long-standing institutions influencing financial development. Authors like Beck 
et al (2002) argue that countries with less favourable geographical and disease environments 
should have less developed financial markets. They present evidence that endowments 
(measured by settler mortality or distance from the equator) are correlated with financial 
                                                                                                                                                      
relates to original sin. In principle, domestic bond market development is a route to solving this problem. As 
domestic markets gain scale and liquidity, foreign participation will be easier to attract, both because those 
local currency markets will become easier to enter and exit (transaction costs will decline) and because they 
will constitute a greater share of the global portfolio (diversification benefits may increase). In practice, 
however, this route to “redemption” appears to work only very slowly. Data in Burger and Warnock (2004) 
indicate that as of 2001 US residents held only USD 2.5 billion bonds issued by emerging markets, whereas 
emerging markets had more than USD 1.6 trillion of local currency bonds outstanding (and more than 
USD 2.2 trillion of total bonds outstanding). In other words, while foreign participation in local bond markets 
has attracted much comment, as a quantitative phenomenon it remains inconsequential. 
15  This phenomenon is familiar in the context of foreign bond issues; see Eichengreen and Mody (2000). 
16  All variables are similarly measured as averages for the 1990s in the scatter plots that follow, except where 
expressly noted otherwise. 
17  La Porta et al (1998), when reporting a positive correlation between debt/GNP and common law legal tradition, 
define debt as the sum of corporate bonds and bank loans. Beck et al (2002) consider financial intermediary 
credits to the private sector divided by GDP. Thus, neither set of authors addresses the impact on bond 
markets that is our concern here. 46  BIS Papers No 30
 
intermediary and stock market development. Figure 3 suggests the existence of a positive 
relationship between distance from the equator and bond market development. 
Riskiness of the investment environment. Bonds are a way for investors to limit risk. It 
follows that entities issuing bonds are generally of higher credit quality than those issuing 
equity claims (Harwood (2000)). In some countries, however, there may be a dearth of high-
quality issuers with proven business models and records of financial probity. Consistent with 
this idea, Figure 4 suggests that bond market capitalisation rises as investment risk declines. 
Law and order. Countries with more reliable law enforcement are more attractive to 
investors. Figure 5 confirms the existence of a positive relationship between the size of bond 
markets and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of law and order. To the 
extent that corruption undermines law enforcement, corruption and bond market 
development should be negatively correlated. Figure 6 is consistent with this hypothesis 
(since, on the ICRG scale utilised here, a higher score indicates a lower level of corruption). 
Weak corporate governance and transparency. If corporate governance is weak, 
managers will be able to enrich themselves at the expense of holders of debt and equity 
claims. If banks enjoying long-term relationships with borrowers have a comparative 
advantage in detecting and correcting insider abuses, savers may prefer to invest via banks 
rather than securities markets. Lenders will also prefer banks to bond markets where 
transparency is low, since banks have a comparative advantage in information-impacted 
markets (Diamond (1991), Hale (2003)). In support of this hypothesis, Figure 7 shows that 
the quality of accounting standards is positively associated with bond market development. 
Developmental stage of the economy. There are a number of reasons why economic 
development and bond market development go hand in hand. Less developed countries 
have volatile investment environments and heavy government involvement in commercial 
activity. Often they have weak creditor rights, inadequate transparency and poor corporate 
governance. GDP per capita can be thought of as capturing these aspects of 
underdevelopment insofar as they are not already absorbed by our other explanatory 
variables. Figure 8 is consistent with the notion that economic development and bond market 
development are positively associated.
18 
Size of the banking system. Banks and bond markets compete in providing external 
finance; in some circumstances, well developed banking systems may succeed in depriving 
bonds of market share. At the same time, banks serve as dealers and market-makers, whose 
presence is needed for the development of a liquid and well functioning bond market.
19 
Figure 9 suggests that the complementarities dominate - that, on balance, banking systems 
and bond markets develop together. 
Banking concentration. Benston (1994), Schinasi and Smith (1998), Smith (1998) and 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest that banks with market power may attempt to stifle the 
development of securities markets by setting loan and deposit rates strategically or use 
moral suasion to discourage public placements by firms with which they have relationships. 
That said, Figure 10, which juxtaposes banking sector concentration against bond market 
development, does not show a particularly strong relationship between the two variables. 
                                                  
18  It suggests that bond markets are less developed than levels of per capita GDP and a broader sample of 
national experiences would predict in, inter alia, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Japan, while they are rather 
better developed in Malaysia. 
19  See Harwood (2000) and Hawkins (2002). In many countries, regulators require that bond business be done 
in a separately capitalised subsidiary, although such firewalls may be more apparent than real. At the same 
time, dealers need a diversified and active investor base with which to buy and sell; they cannot simply trade 
among themselves. Without such a base, dealing will not be profitable. One suspects, therefore, that dealers 
are not so much a precondition for bond market development as a corollary. BIS Papers No 30  47
 
Absence of public sector funding needs. The development of a government securities 
market “helps promote a class of dynamic, profitable fixed-income dealers” (Harwood 
(2000)). In addition, an active and liquid corporate bond market requires a benchmark yield 
curve on the basis of which risky credits can be conveniently priced.
20 That yield curve is 
typically constructed from a suite of outstanding treasury securities, requiring governments to 
issue a range of maturities on a regular schedule. If a government has modest funding 
requirements, there may be little need to develop an active and liquid bond market and little 
regular issuance to maintain a well defined yield curve.
21 Figure 11 is consistent with the 
existence of a positive relationship between private and public sector bond market 
capitalisation.
22 
Poor regulatory enforcement. Investors will be reluctant to take positions in markets 
characterised by opportunistic participants and delivery risk, problems that regulation is 
designed to mitigate. Elements of an adequate regulatory framework include disclosure 
standards, penalties for accountants and auditors providing false information, and sanctions 
for insider trading and market manipulation. Equally important is the clear and consistent 
implementation of regulations. Figure 12 shows that bureaucratic quality is positively 
correlated with bond market development.
23 
Interest rate variability. Where interest rates are variable, investors will have little appetite 
for long-term fixed rate notes, since there is significant risk that the purchasing power of such 
assets will be eroded. Investors’ limited appetite for long-term bonds may thus limit the 
demand for securitised debt. In addition, high levels of interest rate volatility may be an 
indication of inadequate market liquidity, insofar as returns are affected by the entrance or 
exit of a few buyers and sellers from the market. Figure 13 illustrates the negative 
relationship between nominal interest rate volatility and bond market development. 
Level of interest rates. Since few firms can service debts when interest rates are high, high 
rates tend to have a depressing impact on issuance. It follows, as shown in Figure 14, that 
countries with high interest rates show signs of having poorly capitalised bond markets. 
Exchange rate regime. It is argued (by eg Goldstein (1998)) that pegged exchange rates 
encourage foreign investors to underestimate the risks of lending to banks and corporations, 
                                                  
20  Schinasi and Smith (1998) note other advantages of the existence of a benchmark issue: since they are liquid, 
benchmark assets are widely used in repo markets and are typically usable as collateral for a wide range of 
other financial contracts. 
21  It is in principle possible for governments without ongoing funding needs to circumvent this constraint by 
overfunding the fiscal deficit (issuing more debt than strictly necessary, rolling it over as it matures, and 
depositing the resulting cash surplus with the central bank, which allows the central bank to retire its 
sterilisation bonds, thereby unifying the public sector bond market); see McCauley (2003). Thus, despite not 
running current budget deficits, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has been able to create a liquid market in 
Exchange Fund Paper (EFP), with a 10-year yield curve, even in the absence of current government budget 
deficits. EFP was introduced in 1990 with the issuance of 91-day bills, followed by 182- and 364-day bills in 
1990 and 1991, two- and three-year notes in 1993, five-year notes in 1994, seven-year notes in 1995 and 
finally 10-year notes in 1996. The outstanding stock of EFP is more than HKD 100 billion, or more than 8% of 
GDP, and more than 20% of total debt instruments. It is issued through competitive tender bids, was listed on 
the stock exchange in 1999 to enhance liquidity, and can be used as collateral for trading stock options and 
futures. Taiwan, China financed a significant part of its National Development Plan starting in 1991 through 
bond issuance, using a US Treasury bond-type auction system (Lynch (2001)). Similarly, despite limited public 
funding needs, the government of Singapore decided in 1998 to increase the issuance of government 
securities, especially longer-term bonds of benchmark size, and in May 2000 it introduced a repo facility for 
primary dealers. 
22  Note that the variable on the vertical axis, private market capitalisation, is different from that in the other 
figures. 
23  Using simple tabulations, Domowitz et al (2000) similarly find that the share of domestic finance accounted for 
by bonds in emerging markets rises with the quality of accounting standards. 48  BIS Papers No 30
 
and that the resulting foreign competition may slow the development of domestic 
intermediation. From this point of view, greater exchange rate flexibility should encourage the 
development of domestic bond markets (as argued by, inter alia, World Bank (2003)). Of 
course, to the extent that foreign participation is valuable for the growth and development of 
domestic markets, discouraging the participation of international investors by introducing 
additional risk into the market may not produce the desired result.
24 In fact, countries with 
fixed exchange rate regimes do not appear to have bigger bond markets (Figure 15). Figure 
16, however, is consistent with the view that stable exchange rates are conducive to bond 
market development. 
5. Multivariate  analysis 
We now test the importance of these factors using a multivariate regression analysis of 
annual data from 1990 to 2001. The dependent variable, as in the scatter plots, is bond 
market capitalisation as a share of GDP. Recall that this measure includes only domestic 
currency bonds issued by residents and targeted to local investors.
25 
All equations are estimated using panel generalised least squares (GLS) with corrections for 
heteroskedasticity and panel-specific autocorrelation. We start in Table 5 with preliminary 
regressions exploring the importance of, alternately, historical, structural, financial, 
developmental and macroeconomic factors. Definitive hypothesis tests, of course, require 
considering all five categories of explanation simultaneously. We do so in the final column of 
the table. 
The first three columns show the effects of structural characteristics of countries. Consistent 
with earlier arguments, country size and openness are positively related to bond market 
development. Distance from the equator, a proxy for endowment theories, similarly enters 
with its expected positive sign.
26 But where previous studies have shown that English 
common-law legal tradition favours equity market development and bank intermediation, the 
same does not appear to be true of bond markets. It may be that stronger investor rights 
encourage investors to attach less importance to seniority and to substitute equity for debt 
securities.
27 Overall, these results lend support to structural explanations for bond market 
development. 
                                                  
24  There is also the possibility that the correlation reflects causality running in the other direction, from the 
existence of a large domestic financial market to the willingness of countries to countenance additional 
exchange rate variability (Calvo and Reinhart (2002)). 
25  Thus, a limitation of our analysis is that we do not have information on foreign currency denominated issues or 
issues by non-residents denominated in local currency targeted to resident investors. We also do not know 
what share of the domestic currency issues we include are interest rate or exchange rate indexed. Note that 
our measure excludes issues denominated in foreign currency, issues by non-residents, and issues by 
residents targeted to non-residents, all of which are counted as international securities, as they presumably 
should be. 
26  It is not possible to use settler mortality rates in an analysis of Asian bond markets, since relatively few Asian 
countries were colonised by the European powers, and settler mortality estimates (and logic) are based on 
data for and the experience of one-time colonies. 
27  However, the coefficient on this variable is significantly different from zero in only one of the two equations in 
which it is included. Adding dummy variables for other legal origins does not alter these findings. For example, 
when we add French legal origin, the new variable enters positively (and significantly), while English legal 
origin continues to enter negatively and significantly. Since the French civil law tradition is associated with 
relatively weak investor rights, the opposite signs on the two variables are consistent with the explanation in 
the text. BIS Papers No 30  49
 
These regressions also include a dummy variable for Asia, which we interpret as reflecting 
aspects of the region’s history not captured by other variables. The negative coefficient on 
this variable supports historical explanations for the undercapitalisation of the region’s bond 
markets.
28 
The specification in column 4 considers proxies for the developmental stage of the economy: 
the safety of the investment environment (predictability of contract enforcement, danger of 
expropriation), an index of the reliability of law enforcement, and per capita GDP as a 
summary measure of development. While per capita GDP has its expected positive 
coefficient, investment risk and law and order (which are scaled so that higher values 
indicate a more stable investment environment) enter with negative signs. We will return to 
these variables below. 
Columns 5 and 6 consider governance and regulation of the corporate and financial sectors. 
Column 5 shows that countries which have better rankings on the ICRG’s measure of 
corruption and which adhere to international accounting standards (which is likely to enhance 
the effectiveness of corporate governance) have larger bond markets.
29 Column 6 shows that 
countries ranking higher in terms of bureaucratic quality have larger bond markets, which we 
interpret in terms of the efficiency and reliability of regulation. Similarly, countries with better 
developed banking sectors have better developed bond markets - bank and bond market 
intermediation appear to be complements rather than substitutes. On the other hand, 
countries with more concentrated banking systems appear to have smaller bond markets, 
consistent with arguments suggesting that banks with market power may use it to discourage 
bond flotations. Again, we will return to these findings below. 
Column 7 considers macroeconomic factors. While the volatility of interest rates is not 
significant, their level, as measured by the interbank rate minus Libor, suggests that higher 
interest rates are associated with smaller bond markets.
30 The coefficient on the volatility of 
changes in exchange rates is marginally significant, although it is, surprisingly, positive. 
Finally, the capital controls dummy (where a value of one indicates an open capital account) 
suggests that controls slow bond market development.
31 As we show below, this last result is 
the one that turns out to be robust. 
Column 8 considers the entire range of hypotheses.
32 It suggests that no single class of 
factors is wholly responsible for the underdevelopment of Asian bond markets; rather, the 
present state of affairs reflects a confluence of influences. Structure and inheritance matter: 
the size of the economy, its openness, its location, and the origin of its legal system all 
                                                  
28  Note that the coefficient predictably becomes smaller in absolute value the more other independent variables 
are included in the specification. 
29  This is consistent with results in Burger and Warnock (2004) suggesting that countries with stronger 
institutions have larger domestic bond markets. 
30  Domowitz et al (2000) similarly provide evidence that countries with higher rates of inflation issue less 
domestic debt and more equity. 
31  A variety of alternative measures of capital controls point in the same direction. Thus, in addition to the binary 
(“IMF-style”) open or closed measure, we experimented with Brune et al’s (2003) measure, which ranges from 
zero to nine depending on how many of the nine categories of capital account restrictions a country has in 
place. We looked separately at capital account openness for inflows and outflows. We also looked separately 
at controls on inflows and outflows pertaining to capital and money market securities. In virtually all cases we 
obtained the same positive and statistically significant coefficient on controls when using the specification in 
column 7. 
32  Adding all of the explanatory variables substantially reduces the number of observations (from 475 in the full 
sample to 284 in column 8). However, the observations from countries in Asia remain well represented. While 
accounting for 22% of the observations in the full sample, they account for 25% of the observations in 
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influence bond market capitalisation. Factors like these may be difficult to change, although 
some of them, such as the handicap of small size, may be overcome through initiatives like 
the Asian Bond Fund. In addition, adherence to internationally recognised accounting 
standards and the size and concentration of the banking sector are important for bond 
market capitalisation. These are policy variables; our results thus suggest that countries can 
accelerate the development of their bond markets by improving the quality and reliability of 
regulation, requiring corporations to adhere to internationally recognised accounting 
standards, and encouraging competition in financial intermediation. In addition, there is a role 
for macroeconomic policy: both the level of interest rates and the presence or absence of 
capital controls matter in the consolidated specification. 
At first blush, a number of the results are anomalous or at least counter-intuitive. Thus, we 
appear to find that interest rate volatility is good for bond market development. At the same 
time, there is little evidence of a relationship between exchange rate volatility and bond 
market development. We will have more to say about these counter-intuitive results below. 
Note also that when we add direct measures of institutions - such as bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, law and order, and the investment profile - the effect of per capita GDP washes 
out. This is not inconsistent with explanations for bond market growth emphasising the 
developmental stage of the economy, but it suggests that the effects of economic 
development and underdevelopment operate through the aforementioned institutional 
channels. 
We looked further at the robustness of the positive association of bank and bond market 
development, which runs contrary to some popular arguments, and which is likely to be 
controversial. We also regressed non-public bond market capitalisation on bank credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP, adding the entire vector of controls.
33 Excluding public 
sector bonds and considering only bank credit to the private sector avoids the possibility that 
the positive association between the two variables is simply picking up liquidity requirements 
and other policies forcing the banking sector to hold government bonds - and the greater 
ability of the government to compel such behaviour in countries where the banking system is 
relatively large. In this alternative specification the coefficient on bank credit continues to 
enter with a positive coefficient and differs from zero at the 99% confidence level. 
Finally, note that the dummy variable for Asia continues to matter statistically and 
economically. Its effect is large: the coefficient of –17 suggests that Asian bond markets are 
17% smaller as a share of GDP than their counterparts in countries with comparable 
characteristics in other parts of the world. One interpretation of this is that the development of 
bond markets continues to be held back by Asia’s history and current circumstances in ways 
that are not fully captured by the other explanatory variables. We will revisit this finding 
below. 
An eclectic set of policy implications would seem to flow from these findings. The Asian Bond 
Fund and the removal of capital account restrictions may help domestic bond market 
development by relaxing the constraint of small market size, although such policies may be a 
mixed blessing insofar as capital account liberalisation prior to domestic market development 
poses risks as well as promising rewards. But market size is far from the entire problem. In 
addition, governments seeking to promote domestic bond markets must require adherence to 
international accounting standards by security issuing firms and encourage growth and 
competition in banking so as to maximise the complementarities between banking system 
and bond market development. They should adopt stable macroeconomic policies to make it 
attractive to hold domestic currency denominated debt instruments. 
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Even if they take these steps, the results of this section suggest, Asian governments still 
should not expect to succeed in developing bond markets with the depth and liquidity 
characteristic of continental Europe and the English-speaking economies, due to the extent 
to which the region’s markets, institutions and social conventions have adapted to the 
dominance of bank intermediation. This is undoubtedly the most controversial conclusion 
seeming to emerge from the present section. It is important, therefore, to subject it to further 
analysis. 
6.  Adding fiscal policy 
We subjected our results to a variety of robustness checks. We dropped influential 
observations. The results were robust to these changes. We limited the sample to the period 
before the Asian crisis to test for structural breaks. The results were again very similar.
34 
The one sensitivity test that did make an important difference was adding fiscal policy.
35 We 
measured this in three ways: as the public debt/GDP ratio, as the past year’s budget balance 
as a percentage of GDP, and as a three-year moving average of past budget balances. The 
last of these alternatives is probably preferable, since the budget balance in a single year will 
tend to be dominated by transient factors, while public indebtedness is likely to have a 
spuriously strong coefficient given that the public debt is itself a major component of bond 
market capitalisation. 
The results in the first three columns of Table 6 confirm that fiscal policy is important for 
overall bond market development.
36 Stronger fiscal balances are negatively associated with 
bond market capitalisation. The coefficient in the third column reinforces our trepidation 
about using the public debt ratio in that the coefficient is almost exactly unity. We do not 
consider this measure further in what follows. 
Adding past budget balances has a number of other effects. We now obtain a significantly 
negative coefficient on exchange rate volatility. Higher interest rates continue to be obstacles 
to more rapid bond market development. An earlier anomaly, that greater interest rate 
volatility is associated with faster bond market development, is now evident in only one of the 
three specifications.
37 
Adding past budget deficits also eliminates previously significant coefficients on the 
investment profile, accounting standards and bureaucratic quality, while strengthening (at 
least in some cases) the effects of corruption and rule of law.
38 In the case of the investment 
profile, this is reassuring, since the previous result anomalously suggested that safer 
investment environments are associated with less well developed bond markets.
39 The now 
                                                  
34  The main differences were that the corruption and law and order variables became significant (lower levels of 
corruption and more reliable law enforcement were associated with larger bond markets), while distance from 
the equator and domestic credit provided by the banking sector lost their significance. 
35  Asian governments have tended to run surpluses, with a few prominent exceptions, and this otherwise 
admirable behaviour may have stymied the development of bond markets (for reasons explained above). 
36  The observations here are only about half the number in the full sample. However, Asian economies are still 
well represented: they account for 21% of the reduced sample. 
37  As we will see shortly, disaggregating public and private debt makes this anomaly disappear entirely. 
38  To be precise, accounting standards are significant in column 1, where the three-year average of the fiscal 
balance is included, but not in column 2, where an alternative measure of fiscal policy is used. 
39  Table 4 shows that there is a positive correlation between the strength of fiscal policy and the quality/safety of 
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greater importance of corruption and rule of law is also reassuring. However, the loss of 
significance of bureaucratic quality and accounting standards is less reassuring; at face 
value this suggests that financial transparency and the quality and reliability of regulation are 
not so important after all. At a minimum, it suggests that it is hard to distinguish the effects of 
transparency, regulation and fiscal policy. 
But when one distinguishes public debt from private debt (debt issued by both non-financial 
corporations and financial institutions), one finds that budget deficits are a significant 
determinant of public debt market capitalisation (columns 6 and 7) but not private debt 
market capitalisation (columns 4 and 5). In other words, while governments that run deficits 
have significantly more public debt (as a matter of definition), public sector deficits do not 
appear to encourage private debt issuance. That there is no net effect is unsurprising given 
arguments that a history of strong fiscal policies is both good and bad for private debt 
markets. (It creates a more stable investment environment, but complicates the creation of a 
well defined yield curve and slows the development of a class of dynamic fixed income 
dealers.)
 40 
Note, further, that in the regressions for private debt the coefficients on accounting standards 
regain their significance even through fiscal policy is still included.
41 In contrast, they are 
insignificant in the equations for public debt. The same is true for corruption and bureaucratic 
quality. Thus, while institutional characteristics and regulatory practices like accounting 
standards, corruption and bureaucratic quality matter for private debt market capitalisation, 
they evidently matter less for public debt market capitalisation.
42 
Another difference introduced by disaggregating public and private debt has to do with the 
relationship between banking systems and bond markets. Earlier, when considering total 
debt, we found evidence that both the size and concentration of the banking sector matter 
(positively and negatively respectively).
43 Disaggregating reveals that the size of the banking 
system matters mainly for the capitalisation of private debt markets - in other words, there is 
evidence of complementarities between the development of banking and the development of 
private debt markets. In contrast, banking system concentration is negatively associated with 
public debt. Readers familiar with Asia’s economic and financial history will conjecture that in 
countries with concentrated banking systems the government was able to use the banks as 
agents for its industrial policy, channelling private savings towards favoured industries and 
activities, whereas in countries with atomistic banking systems less subject to manipulation, 
direct government expenditures were required for these purposes. 
We also find, upon disaggregating public and private debt, that the earlier evidence of a 
positive relationship between interest rate volatility and bond market development 
disappears. In contrast, the level of interest rates and the stability of the exchange rate 
continue to matter, as before, for both private and public debt. 
Finally, analysing public and private debt separately reveals that the significance of capital 
controls derives from their impact on the volume of public debt. Evidently, governments that 
                                                  
40  To put the point the other way, chronic deficits create an ample supply of sovereign securities from which to 
construct a benchmark yield curve but at the same time crowd out private debt issues (McCauley and 
Remolona (2000)). Our results suggest that these two effects roughly cancel each other out. 
41  Corruption and bureaucratic quality are not significant in the regression for public debt, except in one case 
where the coefficient on bureaucratic quality is marginally significant at the 90% level, and there it counter-
intuitively enters with a negative sign. 
42  This explains the unstable pattern of coefficients when total debt is considered and measures of fiscal policy 
are added or dropped. 
43  However, the evidence that the size of the banking system is important was much weaker when we included 
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open the capital account are better able to fund themselves, whether by selling debt to 
foreigners or owing to credibility effects. Of course, we know from the Asian crisis that to fund 
government deficits in this way before putting the other prerequisites for capital account 
liberalisation in place can be a risky business. And the insignificance of both capital account 
openness and past deficits for private bond market capitalisation suggests that any benefits 
for corporate bond market development are at best indirect. 
Note that adding a measure of past fiscal policies eliminates the previously negative 
coefficient on the dummy variable for Asia in the equations for total debt. This is true whether 
fiscal policy is measured as the past year’s deficit or as a moving average of past deficits. 
Moreover, the coefficient on Asia is now positive, not negative, including in column 3, where 
past fiscal policy is measured by the public debt and the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero (columns 1-3). Once we control for the traditionally strong fiscal stance of Asian 
countries, in other words, there is no longer support for the notion that their bond markets are 
smaller than can be explained by their economic characteristics and policies.
44 
7. Conclusions 
Asia’s underdeveloped bond markets and dependence on bank finance have attracted 
concern since before the crisis of 1997-98. The result has been a host of official responses, 
ranging from reports by the multilateral financial institutions on the importance of reliable 
contract enforcement, strengthened prudential regulation and improved market infrastructure 
to the Asian Bond Fund funded by EMEAP central banks. But it remains uncertain whether 
these initiatives will succeed in surmounting the fundamental obstacles to bond market 
development in the region, since there has been little systematic analysis of the nature of 
those obstacles. This is a gap that the present paper seeks to fill. 
We find that the slow development of local bond markets is a phenomenon with multiple 
dimensions. To some extent the problem is one of minimum efficient scale: larger countries 
have better capitalised bond markets when capitalisation is measured relative to GDP.
45 But 
market size is not the entire problem. In addition, the failure of countries to adhere to 
internationally recognised accounting standards has slowed the development of private debt 
markets. Corruption and low bureaucratic quality, which are signs of unreliable securities 
market regulation, work in the same direction. Countries with competitive, well capitalised 
banking systems, on the other hand, have larger bond markets. 
Macroeconomic policy appears to have played both a supporting and impeding role. On the 
one hand, Asia’s strong fiscal balances, while admirable on other grounds, have not been 
conducive to the growth of government bond markets. Fortunately, there is little evidence 
that the small size of public debt markets is an insurmountable obstacle to corporate bond 
market development. On the other hand, the stability of exchange rates in the region 
appears, if anything, to have encouraged bond market development. 
Over time, markets, institutions and social conventions have adapted to the status quo, 
which in the case of Asia is the dominance of bank finance. Some may worry that, as a result 
                                                  
44  Indeed, when we limit our attention to private debt (columns 4 and 5), both estimates of the Asia dummy are 
significantly greater than zero. For public debt, the sign of the coefficient on the Asia dummy is sensitive to 
how fiscal policy is measured, and it is never significant at the 95% confidence level. 
45  In addition to being supported by our empirical results, this fact is evident in Europe’s experience, where the 
advent of the euro has relaxed the constraint of market size at the national level and greatly enhanced the 
liquidity of the bond markets, the corporate bond market in particular. 54  BIS Papers No 30
 
of this inheritance, Asian countries will not be able to develop bond markets as efficient and 
well capitalised as those of the advanced industrial countries. In this respect our results are 
reassuring: they suggest that the region’s structural characteristics and macroeconomic and 
financial policies account fully for differences in bond market development between Asia and 
the rest of the world. Once one controls for these characteristics and policies, in other words, 
there is no residual “Asia effect”. 
One obstacle that the region must overcome in order to accelerate this process is the legacy 
of capital controls. The evidence is strong that capital controls discourage foreign 
participation in domestic bond markets and that they discourage bond market development 
more generally. But we also know, not least from the Asian crisis, that capital account 
liberalisation is only prudent when domestic financial markets are already deep, liquid and 
robust. Here, obviously, is a dilemma. Capital account liberalisation makes sense only when 
domestic market development is sufficiently advanced, but developing domestic financial 
markets is harder when the capital account remains fully or partly closed. There is no easy 
way of finessing this problem.
46 The only solution is to work harder at strengthening market 
regulation, market infrastructure and the other domestic preconditions for the development of 
local bond markets before giving that process a further push by finally opening the capital 
account. 
Data appendix 
The data set covers the period 1990-2001 at an annual frequency. Sample economies are 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Domestic debt securities 
Domestic debt securities are taken from Table 16A of the BIS domestic and international 
securities statistics, which are regularly published in the annex tables of the BIS Quarterly 
Review. The series are accessible at http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm. 
Interbank interest rates 
Interbank rates are taken from online provider Global Financial Data. Twelve-month 
interbank rates are used wherever they are available. When 12-month rates are not 
available, shorter rates are used, and where shorter rates are not available, we use the 
monthly average of daily overnight interbank rates. 
                                                  
46  In particular, harmonising market regulations and withholding tax regimes or creating a pan-Asian payment 
and settlement system with the goal of encouraging more cross-border investment in the region and thereby 
producing deeper and more liquid markets would be tantamount to encouraging more capital flows and thus 
equivalent to early capital account liberalisation. In other words, doing so would promote market development 
but also heighten crisis risk, which is the very dilemma referred to in the text (Eichengreen (2004)). BIS Papers No 30  55
 
Exchange rates 
Exchange rates are end-month (local currency per US dollar) from line AE in International 
Financial Statistics. 
Institutional variables 
Measures of government stability, investment profile, law and order, corruption and 
bureaucratic quality are from the International Country Risk Guide: 
  Investment profile is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to direct investment. The 
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four 
points and a minimum score of zero points. A score of four points equates to very low risk 
and a score of zero points to very high risk. The subcomponents are: 
• Contract  viability/expropriation 
• Profit  repatriation 
• Payment  delays 
Law and order are assessed separately, with each subcomponent comprising zero to three 
points. The law subcomponent is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, while the order subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of the law. A 
higher score indicates better law and order. 
Corruption is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The index ranges from 
zero to six, where a higher score means a lower degree of corruption. 
Bureaucratic quality is the measure of institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. 
High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In the 
low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political 
pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
Capital control variable 
Coded from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
by Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett; see Brune (2003). 
Other variables 
The following series are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators: 
GDP (constant 1995 US dollars) 
GDP (current US dollars) 
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US dollars) 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international US dollars) 
GDP, PPP (current international US dollars) 
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate) 
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus Libor) 
Lending interest rate (in per cent) 
Credit to private sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
Deposit interest rate (in per cent) 56  BIS Papers No 30
 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
Market capitalisation of listed companies (as a percentage of GDP) 
Market capitalisation of listed companies (current US dollars) 
Overall budget deficit, including grants (as a percentage of GDP) 
Real effective exchange rate index (1995 = 100) 
S&P/IFC investable index (annual change, in per cent) 
Stocks traded, total value (as a percentage of GDP) 




Total outstanding external finance (end-2001) 
As a percentage of GDP 

















Emerging markets  90.21  56.87  5.76  24.96  8.28 
Asia 131.91  75.56  9.27  23.52  12.00 
China 140.59  45.21  0.90  25.04  8.80 
Hong Kong SAR  141.98  310.81  3.07  11.78  11.90 
Korea 110.37  54.97  27.84  18.32  23.20 
Malaysia 156.23  135.92  50.40  36.57  7.54 
Singapore 102.95  138.25  6.71  34.16  20.61 
Thailand 112.03  31.67  4.96  26.17  0.35 
Latin America  41.21  38.70  1.73  26.12  4.53 
Argentina 37.13  71.62  2.71  9.11  2.04 
Brazil 59.19  37.06  0.56  51.99  9.40 
Chile 76.74  89.28  8.82  29.76  13.86 
Mexico 24.69  20.49  1.52  12.10  0.68 
Central Europe  42.48  16.04  1.23  29.32  0.92 
Czech Republic  51.84  16.22  4.79  36.35  4.61 
Hungary 49.54  19.80  1.53  35.31  0.00 
Poland 37.34  14.85  0.00  25.26  0.00 
Developed 
economies 194.13  122.92  20.55  85.18  33.64 
Australia 93.99  101.55  12.25  17.13  16.75 
Canada 93.18  90.86  10.50  59.60  14.33 
Japan 308.67  92.10  16.48  104.45  15.94 
New Zealand  120.00  36.82  0.00  28.36  0.00 
United States  160.56  137.48  23.90  83.53  43.32 
Europe 121.30  156.25  8.05  44.12  28.44 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI); BIS. 
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Table 2 
Composition of external finance (end-2001) 
As a percentage of total 
 
Domestic credit 







issuers and public 
sector) 
Emerging markets  50.74  31.98  17.28 
Asia 54.90  31.45  13.65 
China 66.40  21.35  12.25 
Hong Kong SAR  30.36  66.46  3.17 
Korea 52.18  25.99  21.82 
Malaysia 41.21  35.85  22.94 
Singapore 36.50  49.01  14.49 
Thailand 64.08  18.11  17.81 
Latin America  38.24  35.91  25.85 
Argentina 30.79  59.40  9.80 
Brazil 39.78  24.91  35.31 
Chile 37.51  43.64  18.86 
Mexico 41.99  34.85  23.17 
Central Europe  47.69  18.01  34.30 
Czech Republic  47.48  14.85  37.67 
Hungary 46.66  18.65  34.69 
Poland 48.21  19.18  32.61 
Developed 
economies 45.92  29.08  25.01 
Australia 41.79  45.15  13.06 
Canada 36.66  35.75  27.58 
Japan 59.17  17.65  23.18 
New Zealand  64.80  19.88  15.32 
United States  39.60  33.91  26.50 
Europe 42.32  38.72  18.96 
Sources: WDI; BIS. 
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Table 3 
New external finance in emerging markets  
As a percentage of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Emerging 
markets  22.47 27.03 18.69 23.20 20.28 
Domestic  18.05 24.47 15.77 19.56 17.33 
Equities  1.00 0.92 1.26 0.67 0.54 
Bonds       
  Private  0.30 0.33 0.30 2.59 3.25 
  Public  10.45 17.73 11.50 10.25  9.09 
Bank  loans       
  Private  4.55 4.49 2.25 5.29 2.72 
  Public  1.74 1.00 0.46 0.76 1.72 
International 4.42 2.56 2.93 3.64 2.95 
Equities  0.50 0.16 0.46 0.84 0.25 
Bonds       
  Private  1.12 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.88 
  Public  1.12 0.81 1.01 0.86 0.83 
Bank  loans       
  Private  1.14 0.61 0.65 1.04 0.79 
  Public  0.54 0.42 0.18 0.32 0.20 
Asia  12.63 15.88 16.77 19.72 22.20 
Domestic  8.46 14.38 14.57 16.21 19.03 
Equities  1.49 0.99 1.93 1.03 0.60 
Bonds       
  Private  0.00 0.00 0.05 2.12 3.00 
  Public  0.36 2.52 2.49 2.78 5.28 
Bank  loans       
  Private  6.70 7.56 8.54 9.08 7.53 
  Public  –0.09 3.31 1.56 1.21 2.61 
International 4.16 1.50 2.20 3.51 3.16 
Equities  0.55 0.24 0.76 1.32 0.43 
Bonds       
  Private  1.04 0.20 0.45 0.62 1.21 
  Public  0.74 0.35 0.54 0.39 0.57 
 60  BIS Papers No 30
 
Table 3 (cont) 
New external finance in emerging markets 
As a percentage of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bank loans           
  Private  1.18 0.27 0.26 0.81 0.80 
  Public  0.65 0.43 0.21 0.37 0.16 
Central  Europe  20.88 30.19 24.52 24.30 33.47 
Domestic  17.52 26.81 21.49 21.67 31.08 
Equities  0.54 2.52 1.30 0.51 0.34 
Bonds          
  Private  0.21 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.11 
  Public  17.69 18.03 23.07 22.35 22.85 
Bank loans       
 Private  1.46  4.50  –1.48  0.45  4.24 
 Public  –2.38  1.66  –1.53  –1.71  3.54 
International 3.36 3.38 3.03 2.63 2.39 
Equities  1.07 0.56 0.45 0.15 0.00 
Bonds          
  Private  0.52 0.82 0.69 0.33 0.66 
  Public  0.52 0.96 1.05 0.50 0.78 
Bank loans           
  Private  0.73 0.55 0.49 1.49 0.43 
  Public  0.52 0.50 0.35 0.17 0.52 
Latin  America  34.52 38.45 20.20 27.59 15.35 
Domestic  29.63 34.89 16.31 23.60 12.55 
Equities  0.50 0.60 0.33 0.23 0.50 
Bonds          
  Private  0.67 0.72 0.68 3.61 4.17 
  Public  21.44 33.98 21.50 18.05 11.08 
Bank loans           
  Private  2.46 1.19  –5.56 1.12  –3.47 
 Public  4.56  –1.59  –0.65  0.59  0.27 
International 4.89 3.55 3.89 3.99 2.80 
Equities  0.34 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.08 
Bonds          
  Private  1.32 0.91 0.89 0.56 0.52 
  Public  1.67 1.27 1.64 1.54 1.17 BIS Papers No 30  61
 
Table 3 (cont) 
New external finance in emerging markets 
As a percentage of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bank  loans       
  Private  1.15 0.98 1.21 1.27 0.84 
  Public  0.41 0.39 0.11 0.28 0.19 
Note: Dollar amounts are from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues (March 2003). GDP data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Emerging markets include China, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, 



























Correlations of explanatory variables 





























































GDP, PPP   1                                 
Exports to 
GDP  (%)  –0.2511 1                         
Dummy for 
Asia  –0.1045 0.517  1                        
Dummy for 
English legal 
origin  0.2960 0.3069  0.2452  1                      
Distance 
from equator  0.0131 –0.4452  –0.6842  –0.3749 1                     
Investment 
profile 0.1807 0.1415 –0.1082  0.0953 –0.0496 1                    
Law and 
order 0.1658 0.0917  –0.3004 0.2509 0.5557 0.0247 1                     
GDP per 
capita, PPP  0.4217 –0.0032 –0.4491  0.1586 0.6141 0.171 0.7602 1                 
Corruption –0.0273 –0.0552  –0.3841 –0.0111 0.6711 –0.0405 0.6468 0.6298 1               
Accounting 
standards 0.1402 0.3326  0.1509  0.4985 0.1489 –0.0344 0.4411 0.4720 0.4028 1               






























Table 4 (cont) 
Correlations of explanatory variables 






























































quality  0.2337 0.0745 –0.3017  0.2666 0.5625 0.1557 0.7582 0.8176 0.7016 0.5669 0.4373 0.1927 1         
Interest rate 
volatility –0.1436 –0.1417  0.0729  –0.2013 –0.3703 –0.0713 –0.6644 –0.5824 –0.4733 –0.3767 –0.3942 –0.0222 –0.5799 1       
Interest rate 
spread –0.1516 –0.2699  –0.0111  –0.2893 –0.2219 –0.2787 –0.6057 –0.5791 –0.295 –0.3633 –0.389 –0.0602 –0.5275 0.7165 1     
Exchange 


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








     0.012 
(19.04)*** 






     0.265 
(5.02)*** 






     –16.899 
(4.85)*** 




     –18.426 
(3.74)*** 
Distance from equator      110.339 
(11.79)*** 
     65.177 
(4.10)*** 
Investment profile        –0.371 
(1.97)** 
    –0.542 
(1.71)* 
Law and order        –0.674 
(1.47) 
    0.808 
(0.82) 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international 
thousands of US dollars) 
    3.179 
(30.53)***
    –0.291 
(1.26) 
Corruption       3.383 
(4.90)***
   0.023 
(0.03) 
Accounting standards (La Porta et al (1998))          0.630 
(6.66)***
   0.775 
(3.47)*** 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (as a 
percentage of GDP) 









































Table 5 (cont) 
Multivariate analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




Standard deviation of change in log of exchange 
rates 
























Observations  475 475 421 469 395 405 400 284 
Number of id  41  41  36  41  34  41  38  30 



























 Total  Private  Public 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




































































































GDP per capita, PPP (current international 











































Domestic credit provided by banking sector (as a 





















































Table 6 (cont) 
Sensitivity analysis 
 Total  Private  Public 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 


























































IMF capital controls dummy variable  
































Outstanding domestic debt securities issued by 
public sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
   1.094 
(45.88)*** 















Observations  231   235   284   231   235   231   235 
Number  of  id  28 29 30 28 29 28 29 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1 
Bond markets and country size 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Figure 2 
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   y = 47.0216 + 0.0132 x
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   y = 56.6124 + −0.0343 x
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Figure 3 
Bond markets and distance from equator 
 
 
Note: Measured by absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between zero and one. 
Source: La Porta et al (1999). 
Figure 4 
Bond markets and investment profile 
 
Note: See data appendix. 
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   y = −83.1888 + 19.4645 x
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Figure 5 
Bond markets and law and order 
 
Note: See data appendix. 
Source: ICRG. 
Figure 6 
Bond markets and corruption 
 
Note: See data appendix. 
Source: ICRG. 
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Figure 7 
Bond markets and accounting standards 
 
Note: A higher score means a better accounting standard. 
Source: La Porta et al (1998). 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 




Bond markets and bank concentration 
 
Source: Beck et al (1999). 
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   y = 17.5699 + 0.4158 x
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Figure 11 




Bond markets and bureaucratic quality 
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   y = −36.1273 + 29.1189 x
t-stat: (1.85)       (4.85)                                               r-squared: 0.38 
Bureaucratic quality
Outstanding domestic debt securities issued by public sector (% of GDP)  
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Figure 13 
Bond markets and interest rate volatility 
 
Sources: Global Financial Database (GFD); authors’ calculations. 
Figure 14 
Bond markets and the level of interest rates 
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Figure 15 
Bond markets and fixed exchange rate regime 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
Figure 16 
Bond markets and exchange rate volatility 
 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS); author’s calculations. 
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